JAMES BARHAMJames A. Barham was born in Dallas, Texas, and trained in Classics at the University of Texas at Austin and in the History of Science at Harvard University. He also pursued advanced study towards the Ph.D. degree under the auspices of Harvard University in Athens, Greece, and Belgrade, Yugoslavia. He then worked for about 20 years as an independent scholar, publishing some dozen articles on evolutionary epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the foundations of biology in a variety of print and electronic journals, including BioSystems, Evolution and Cognition, Rivista di Biologia, and Metanexus.com. His work consists of a critique of the mechanistic and Darwinian images of life and mind, as well as an exploration of alternative means of understanding value, purpose, and meaning as objectively real, natural phenomena. He reentered graduate school in 2003, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the History and Philosophy of Science Program at the University of Notre Dame.Education2003 – Present. University of Notre Dame, History and Philosophy of Science Program (Philosophy Track), Ph.D. CandidateTeaching Experience (Adjunct)
1977-79. Byzantine Institute, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Visiting Fellow
1976-77. University of Athens, Athens, Greece. Sheldon Traveling Fellow
1976. Harvard University, M.A. History of Science
1972. University of Texas at Austin, B.A. in ClassicsMr. Barham has taught "Greek Civilization" in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania, Millersville, Pennsylvania. He also taught "Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science" at Franklin & Marshall College in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.Selected Publications"The Emergence of Biological Value", in William A. Dembski and Michael Ruse, eds., Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 210--226.
"Theses on Darwin," Rivista di Biologia/Biology Forum, 2002, 95: 115--147.
“Biofunctional Realism and the Problem of Teleology,” Evolution and Cognition, 2000, 6: 2--34.
“On the Objectivity of the Scala Naturae,” Evolution and Cognition, 1999, 5: 2--11.
“A Dynamical Model of the Meaning of Information,” BioSystems, 1996, 38: 235--241.